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Changes in defense expenditures have been used to analyze the response of NATO 
members to doctrine transformation and the behavior of NATO as an international alliance.  The 
distribution of defense expenditures among NATO members raises questions about each nation’s 
role in the collective defense effort that is the raison d’être of a military alliance.  Since its 
inception in 1949, NATO has adopted three distinct defense doctrines, Mutually Assured 
Destruction (MAD), flexible response, and crisis management.  These distinct defense strategies 
should have influenced the level and distribution of contributions to the common defense.   
The allies adopted a doctrine of mutual assured destruction in the early years between 
1949 and 1966.  This doctrine essentially relied on US superiority in strategic nuclear weapons 
as a credible deterrent and automatic threat to counter any Soviet territorial expansion.  The 
reliance on strategic nuclear weapons meant that NATO’s security rested primarily with the US 
forces and as such, the US was responsible for a disproportionate share of NATO defense. 
As the Soviet Union began to build its strategic forces in the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
NATO changed its doctrine to that of flexible response allowing for a measured response to 
aggression that would avoid an immediate nuclear exchange.   The allies prepared to defend 
themselves against conventional forces. As a result, the allies supplemented strategic forces with 
tactical and conventional forces to allow for a response that is commensurate to acts of 
aggression and NATO could  escalate the response if needed.   In addition, NATO allies began to 
build up their conventional forces and support US troops and military installations in Europe.  
This change implied that NATO members would shoulder a greater share of NATO defense and 
would decrease reliance on US forces. 
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With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the end of the Cold War, NATO no longer 
faced a common threat.   NATO’s roles and responsibilities evolved during this period. Security 
concerns extended beyond NATO’s boundaries and new strategic doctrines were developed by 
the allies to deal with the emerging threats.  The perceived challenges included managing crisis 
such as civil wars, disputes over natural resources, natural disasters, peacekeeping missions, and 
nuclear, biological, and chemical arms control.  The allies began downsizing to take advantage 
of a peace dividend.   
This study will address two issues by examining the ally’s defense expenditure patterns 
from 1949 to 2005.  The first issue is to ascertain if the three major changes in NATO doctrine 
are reflected in each ally’s policy.  The second is to determine whether the allies are acting as 
members of an alliance in a cooperative and common way, or whether the allies are pursuing 
their specific defense agendas.  We do this by testing for breaks in the mean function of the 
defense expenditure growth process.  A statistically significant shift, or structural break, 
indicates a change in defense expenditure patterns in response to policy changes.  A positive 
break is indicative of an increase in the growth process of defense expenditures. A higher growth 
after a break indicates an expansion of the military.  An expenditure growth after the break that is 
positive but less than the growth before the break represents a slowdown in rate of growth of 
military expenditures.  A downsizing in the growth of military expenditures is a negative break 
in the mean function of expenditure growth. To address the first issue, we examine the date of 
the structural breaks in defense expenditures to determine if they correspond to the period of 
NATO policy change.  To answer the second issue, if NATO nations are behaving as members 
of an alliance and responding in a collective manner to threats, then the break dates (change 
points in defense expenditures) and direction of the breaks should be similar for the allies.  The 
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breaks in this study are determined using multiple structural change tests developed by Bai and 
Perron (1998, 2003).  These tests determine the break date endogenously and allow up to a 
maximum of five structural shifts in the model.  The newer members of the alliance, Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and 
Spain will not be included in the study since there are insufficient data to test. 
With a few exceptions, the study provides no empirical evidence to suggest that NATO 
allies modified their behavior in any way to correspond to the three NATO doctrines.  In 
addition, there is no evidence to suggest that NATO members are responding in a joint and 
concerted manner to threats.  Structural breaks in defense expenditures for nearly every one of 
the NATO allies are associated with an ally specific defense agenda.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  In the next section, we discuss the 
theory of alliances and NATO.  We, then, review the empirical tests and data to be analyzed.  
The last section presents the results, concludes, and offers policy advice. 
 
 
Theory of Alliances  
Military alliances are formed based on the logic of collective action.  Allies need to 
prepare for action collectively and respond to threats collectively.  Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) 
develop a model of organizations that are formed by nations to further their collective interests.  
They illustrate that larger nation members of organizations bear a disproportionate share of the 
financial responsibility for the collective organization.  Such behavior threatens the 
independence of the organization and results in concern for the financial well being of the 
organization.  In providing a good or service, an international organization, produces a public 
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good for the members of the organization.  All members of the organization automatically 
benefit from the public good and the good can be made available to other members of the 
organization at little or no marginal cost.  The public good is non-rival and non-excludable.  
NATO’s proclaimed purpose is to protect its member nations from aggression, with aggression 
against one of its members considered an aggression against the collective.1 The public good 
produced by NATO, deterring aggression, would be available to all its members and NATO 
should be able to expand its membership at little or no marginal cost.  To test their theory that 
alliances provide public benefits, Olson and Zeuckhauser, find a significant positive correlation 
between GDP and military expenditures as a percentage of GDP for 1964 and conclude that GDP 
has a positive effect on military expenditures indicating that the larger NATO allies are 
shouldering the smaller allies defense burdens. These results are descriptive of the doctrine of 
MAD, characteristic of NATO between 1949 and the late 1960s when the reliance on strategic 
weapons meant that NATO’s security rested primarily with the US strategic forces.2 
In the late 1960s and the 1970s, NATO moved from the doctrine of mutual assured 
destruction to that of flexible response, which envisioned a measured response to acts of 
aggression and, if necessary, allowed for an escalation.  The result was a shift from strategic to a 
combination of strategic, tactical, and conventional weapons.  The public goods model no longer 
applied to NATO.  The defense burden seemed to be shared more evenly between the larger and 
smaller allies, who were expected to maintain their conventional forces and defend themselves in 
the European theater.  Researchers use the joint products model, which allows military 
expenditures to provide both public and private goods, to describe this period.  Sandler and 
Forbes (1980) describe a continuum of alliances with a purely deterrent on one extreme and a 
purely protective on the other.   The closer an alliance is to the purely protective, the greater is 
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the proportion of excludable benefits.  The joint products model describes an alliance that is 
closer to the purely protective. They include both ability to pay and benefits received measures to 
an analyze behavior within an international organization.  The proxies for ability to pay are 
military expenditure share of GDP, a measure of the internal burden of defense, and each allies’ 
share of total NATO defense expenditures, a measure of the external burden of defense.  The 
benefit proxies are the allies’ shares of overall population, GDP, and exposed borders.  They find 
that the dependence between GDP and ratio of defense expenditures to GDP supports a public 
goods model between 1960 and 1966.  After 1967, the correlation between the two variables is 
weak indicating a shift from a deterrent alliance towards a more conventional cooperative 
alliance.  In addition, they find a shift of defense expenditures from the US to the European 
allies.   
The flexible response era can be divided into two distinct periods, 1967 to 1980 and 1981 
to 1990 (Sandler and Murdoch, 2000).  While a joint products model characterizes the first 
period, a joint products model with some public benefits best describes the second period.  The 
years from 1981 to 1990 were defined by the Reagan procurement and strategic build up and the 
upgrading and modernizing of the British and French strategic forces.  Khanna and Sandler 
(1996) and Sandler and Murdoch (2000) extend the analysis of NATO alliance behavior to 
include data covering the 1981 to 1990 period. They conclude that exploitation of the larger 
allies by the smaller allies increased due to the Reagan, British, and French strategic forces build 
up in the first half of the 1980s.  The correlation between benefits received and defense burdens 
indicate a degree of cooperation in the alliance. However, the remainder of the period indicates 
NATO allies allocating defense spending based on nation specific concerns.   
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The 1990s to the present are characterized by the end of the cold war.  NATO allies no 
longer faced a common threat from the Warsaw Pact. The allies reduced defense expenditures to 
take advantage of a peace dividend.  NATO’s strategic doctrine changed to reflect the new 
realities.  NATO allies identified the threat from rogue nations, ethnic conflicts, peacekeeping, 
and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as its priorities.  Even though this 
period is still best characterized by a joint products model, more elements of public goods are 
appearing and the defense burden of the larger allies could increase.  Sandler and Murdoch 
(2000) analyze NATO alliance behavior to include data up to 1999 and find insignificant 
correlation between economic size and defense burdens and a match between defense burdens 
and proxy measures of defense benefits.  This match is less significant for 1999, which is 
indicative of the increasing share of public benefits. 
Amara (2006) studies the long run behavior of the NATO allies from 1949 to 2002 and 
concludes that despite the US defense burden being the largest in absolute value, Turkey and 
Greece are the two countries that have steadily increased their defense burdens. Even though the 
concept of a military alliance would imply that NATO should have an integrated response over 
the long run to defense issues, it appears regional issues are the main drivers of military 
expenditures.  Turkey and Greece are on the upper end of the defense burden and are clearly 
responding to defense concerns that are not shared by the remaining allies.   
 
NATO 
The North Atlantic Treaty signed in 1949, by  Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, 
Greece, Italy, Iceland,3 Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, US, and the UK, established 
NATO as a cooperative defense organization with each ally contributing a share to the defense of 
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the collective.  However, with most of its members still recovering from the devastation of 
World War II, the burden of NATO defense fell on the United States with the expectation that 
the allies would gradually increase their contribution.  Greece and Turkey joined NATO in 1952, 
West Germany in 1955, Spain in 1982, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland in 1999 and 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia in 2004.   
NATO has undergone a rapid expansion during the last decade with a significant 
redrawing of the NATO border to the east.  From an economic standpoint, the alliance should be 
expanded if the benefits of expansion are greater than the costs.  When the new allies joined 
NATO it was assumed that they would eventually contribute to the security of the alliance and 
share in the costs of defense burden4.  The costs of expansion include the costs of modernizing 
the new member’s forces, the cost of intelligence, equipment, training, the cost of projecting 
NATO power to the new borders, and the cost of communication and control.  While these 
additional costs are to be picked up by the new and current members, it is highly unlikely that the 
economies of the new members will allow them to undergo this tremendous investment.  Their 
defense budgets are small, their economies are fragile and in transition and their populations do 
not appear to support an increase in the proportion of government spending devoted to defense.  
They are not in a position to increase their military budgets to meet NATO’s military 
requirements.  Quite likely, the wealthier NATO allies will underwrite the costs.  Instead of the 
new alliance members fully integrating into NATO, proposals have been made where each 
NATO member would specialize and provide a niche capability.  However, it appears that 
NATO is leaning toward integrating new members into its structure. 
 9 
Tables 1, 2, and 3 identify defining events during the three major periods of NATO 
doctrine that are of concern to NATO and may have influenced allies to respond jointly or may 




We use a structural change test to explain NATO defense expenditures over time.  Structural 
changes result from a discreet change in the population regression coefficients from one period 
to another.  Recent research on structural change in time series econometrics enables us to be 
explicit about the timing and the significance of the changes or breaks.  A statistically significant 
break in the mean function of defense expenditures reflects a change in defense expenditure 
patterns in response to policy changes.  The mean shifts can be negative indicating a downsizing 
in expenditure growth.  A positive mean shift is indicative of an increase in the growth of 
defense expenditures. If the NATO nations are behaving as members of an alliance and 
responding in a collective manner to threats and to major changes in NATO doctrine and policy, 
then the break dates (change in the defense expenditure growth process) and direction of the 
mean shifts should be similar for the allies. The breaks in this study are determined using 
multiple structural change tests developed by Bai and Perron (1998, 2003).6  These tests allow 
for multiple breaks and determine the break points endogenously. We use three tests to draw our 
conclusions.  The first test identifies the number of breaks and the break dates sequentially.  The 
second two tests are double maximum tests that test the null hypothesis of no breaks against the 
alternative of an unknown number of breaks. The sequential test is run at each possible break 
point and the sum of squared residuals calculated for the divided data sample.  The first break 
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point is selected based on the minimization of the sum of squared residuals for the sub-samples.  
Once the first break point is identified, the data is divided into two sub-samples separated by the 
first estimated break.  For each sub-sample, a one-break model is estimated and the second break 
point is chosen for the greatest reduction in the sum of squared residuals.  The sample is then 
repartitioned in three regimes and the third point is selected as the estimate from three estimated 
one break models that allows the greatest reduction in the sum of squared residuals.  This process 
is continued until the maximum number of break point is reached.  The test is a sup Wald type 
test and is labeled sup FT(l +1|l). The sup FT statistic is a generalization of the sup F statistic 
considered by Andrews (1993) and others for the case of one structural change.  It considers a 
null hypothesis of l breaks against the alternative hypothesis that an additional break exists, l +1.  
The sup FT statistic is obtained by maximizing the difference between the sum of squared 
residual for the null and alternative hypothesis.  For a model with l breaks, the estimated break 
points are obtained by a minimization of the sum of squared residuals.  The null hypothesis of l 
breaks is rejected in favor of the model with l +1 breaks if the overall minimal value of the sum 
of squared residuals for the alternative model is sufficiently smaller than the sum of squared 
residuals from the l break model.  The break date selected is the one associated with the overall 
minimum.7  Bai and Peron (1998, 2001) report the critical values for the test.  
The sup FT(l +1|l) test requires the specification of a number of breaks for the null.  Bai 
and Perron (1998) develop two tests where the number of breaks does not need to be pre-
determined.  The double maximum tests consider a null hypothesis of no structural break against 
an unknown number of breaks given some upper bound of breaks.8  The two double maximum 
tests differ in their use of weights for the breaks.  The weights reflect the imposition of prior 
conditions on the likelihood of various number of breaks.  The first test, the equal weighted 
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double maximum test UDmaxFT, gives equal weights of unity to all the breaks.  The second, the 
weighted double maximum test WDmaxFT, recognizes that as the maximum number of breaks 
increases, a fixed sample of data becomes less informative about the tested hypothesis since the 
critical values decrease leading to a test with low power.  The WDmaxFT alleviates this problem 
by adding weights to each break.  The weights applied are such that the marginal p-values are 
equal across values of m.  This implies that the weights are dependent on the significance level 
and the number of covariates.  There are no theoretical guidelines about the best choice of double 
maximum tests.  
We allow up to a maximum of five breaks and use a trimming of ε = 0.159.  The test 
allow for serial correlation and different variances in the residuals across the segments resulting 
from the breaks.  We follow the strategy recommended by Bai and Perron (2003) by first 
examining both double maximum tests to determine if at least one break is present. If these two 
tests are significant and indicate the presence of at least one structural break, we determine the 
number of breaks by a sequential examination of the sup-FT(l + 1|l) statistics ignoring the 
sequential sup-FT(1|0) test.  If the supFT(l + 1|l) are insignificant and the double maximum tests 
are significant, the results indicate the presence of one structural break.  If the sequential 
procedure fails to reject the null hypothesis when the number of breaks is low but is able to reject 
the alternative for a larger number of breaks, we choose the larger number of breaks because of 
the low power of the test in detecting smaller number of breaks when numerous breaks exist. 
   
Data 
NATO figures on military spending are highly reliable and use a common definition for 
defense.  NATO has gone through the process of producing standardized figures that reflect 
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expenditures for comparable categories for each country.  The attempt at standardization is to 
assist in the assignment of defense burden sharing among the member countries.   
Data for NATO military expenditures are from NATO Review, which reports them in 
current year national currency.  Military expenditure data are available from 1949-2004 for 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Turkey, UK and the US.  Data for Germany is from 1953-2002.  We use the CPI of each country 
as reported in the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics May 2005 
with 2000 as the base year to convert to real military expenditures.  The data used is annual data 
expressed in logarithms 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The two questions this study attempts to answer are whether the three major changes in 
NATO doctrine and policy are reflected in changes in defense expenditures, and whether allies 
pursued ally specific defense agendas or acted as members of an alliance in a cooperative and 
common way.  
To answer the first question, we look for structural breaks in NATO defense expenditures 
that are descriptive of the theoretical underpinnings of the alliance behavior during the three 
periods.  Therefore, we would expect two structural breaks for the allies.  The first should occur 
around 1966/1967 with the transition from MAD to flexible response, and the second around 
1989/1990 for the move from flexible response to crisis management  The MAD period when the 
reliance on strategic weapons meant that NATO’s security rested primarily with the US strategic 
forces, should be characterized by US military expenditures growth.  The flexible response era 
should be a period of defense expenditure growth for all the NATO allies who were expected to 
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maintain their conventional forces and defend themselves in the European theater.  The US 
should have either slower defense spending growth or no growth at all.  The last period, crisis 
management, should be a period of either a slowdown or declining defense expenditure growth 
for all allies as they take advantage of the end of the cold war. 
The results of the structural tests are summarized in Tables 4 to 6.  Table 4 details the 
structural break dates for NATO defense expenditures and their significance levels.  Table 5 
gives the average annual defense expenditure growth rates before and after each break.  Table 6 
groups the breaks for each ally into the period in which they occur, MAD, flexible response, and 
crisis management.  Figure 1 presents the allies annual defense expenditures and their changing 
means. 
The answer to the first question of whether the three major changes in NATO doctrine 
and policy are reflected in changes in defense expenditures is quite weak.  The allies exhibit little 
of the expected characteristics in moving between the three periods.  If we examine each 
country’s structural break, none appear to match the dates for the transitions between doctrines.  
There are some exceptions.  An argument may be made for the break in 1965 for France.  It is 
close to the end of MAD period and indicates positive growth in defense expenditures for 
France.   Greece’s break in 1968 and Norway’s in 1967 are close to the beginning date for the 
flexible response period.  However, both counties exhibit decreasing defense expenditure growth 
contrary to the expectations for the period.  Finally, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, 
Luxemburg, and the UK all have a break during the crisis management era.  This last structural 
break is followed by either a slowdown or downsizing of expenditure growth.  This is very 
consistent with the theoretical expectations for the period. However, only Belgium’s break is 
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close enough to the beginning of the crisis management era to be interpreted as resulting from 
the fall of the Berlin Wall. 
We address the second question in two parts.  To respond to whether NATO countries 
acted as members of an alliance in a cooperative and common way, we look for commonalities 
in spending growth patterns and break dates that correspond to the timing of  events of 
importance to NATO as summarized in Tables 1,2, and 3.  There is little evidence to support the 
premise of cooperative and common behavior among the allies.  One possible commonality is 
that all the allies, except Portugal, exhibit the highest rate of defense expenditure growth before 
their first structural break.  This could be due to several factors such as the rebuilding efforts 
after World Was II, the strengthening economies, and the height of the Cold War.  Another 
commonality in defense spending growth comes after the last break for all NATO allies 
regardless of when the break occurs.  A majority of the allies, except Canada, Luxemburg, and 
Portugal, have a slowdown or downsizing in growth following the last break.  In addition, 
Denmark, Germany, Italy, and the UK experience a reduction in expenditure growth in the mid 
1970s.  These reductions are clustered around the SALT I agreement of 1972. 
 If we attempt to explain the breaks and direction of defense expenditure growth using 
ally specific concerns, it appears that NATO members, in general, adjusted their defense 
spending according to economic imperatives, political issues, and ally specific defense agendas.  
Both of Belgium’s breaks signal a decrease in defense expenditure growth. The structural 
break for Belgium in 1969 marks the beginning of the constitutional change from a central to a 
federal government to accommodate the three major communities, Flemish, French, and 
German.  The resulting decrease in defense expenditure growth is consistent with the literature 
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on decentralization that finds a decrease in defense expenditure growth resulting from increased 
decentralization.10 
All of Canada’s five breaks are preceded by a change in government. In addition to a 
change in government, the breaks in 1975 and 1982 follow changes in domestic economic 
conditions. 
Denmark’s structural break in 1974 followed a complete change in the political parties 
that comprise the structure of the government.   The reason behind the break in 1961 is less 
evident. 
France’s break in 1956 could signal a decrease in expenditure growth following its defeat 
and withdrawal from Southeast Asia (Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia) and the Suez Canal.  The 
subsequent period is characterized by an increase in expenditure growth that could be the result 
of France’s preoccupation with the Algerian war of independence.  The third break, which 
signals an increase in defense expenditures, follows the election of the conservative government 
of Valery Giscard D’Estaing.  The fourth break in 1984 follows the election of a socialist 
government. 
Greece’s break in 1968 follows the military coup d’etat in 1967 that established a military 
dictatorship.  The break also follows a severe economic downturn. 
Italy’s break in 1973 came amid a period of political turmoil with several changes of 
government in 1972, 1973 and 1974.  Italy also faced a severe economic crisis during this period 
that resulted in austerity measures and reductions in government expenditures.  
Luxemburg’s first break in 1975 follows the steel crisis that resulted from the world- 
wide decline of demand for steel.  The decline precipitated an economic downturn given that the 
Luxemburg industrial structure was dominated by the steel industry.  This economic downturn 
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resulted in a massive increase in welfare payments and social security benefits to households that 
reached 24% of GDP in 1981.  The second break in 1986 marks the beginning of an economic 
recovery resulting from a boom in financial services, the stepping-up of the economic 
diversification policy, and a pay moderation policy, which helped to restore the cost-
competitiveness of the Luxembourg economy.  
The Netherlands, in 1963, turned over the western half of New Guinea to Indonesia, 
withdrew its forces, ending 300 years of Dutch presence in Asia.  The break for the Netherlands 
in 1963 marks a decrease in defense expenditure growth. 
 Portugal’s break and high defense spending growth in 1960 is reflective of its internal 
turmoil and preoccupation with its colonies in Africa.  The second break in 1975 and its negative 
expenditure growth mark the conclusion of its commitment in Africa and the beginning of 
political reform following the coup in 1974.  The break in 1987 coincides with improving 
economic conditions, admission to the European Union, and elections resulting in a strong single 
party government. 
Turkey is notable in that the defense expenditure growth remains the highest among all 
NATO after its one break11.  The break in 1978 follows the diffusion of tension between Turkey 
and Greece over Cyprus resulting from UN mediation. 
The break for the UK in 1963 marks the transition in power from the conservatives to 
labor and the continued retreat from colonialism and a start of a period of economic stringency 
and inflation.  The second break for the UK in 1973 coincides with the UK’s entry into the EEC 
and the international oil crisis that was accompanied by a domestic coal crisis. 
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The USA’s single break in 1956 comes at the end of massive increase in expenditure 
growth during the beginning of the cold war and end of the Korean War. 
The reasons behind the breaks for the rest of the allies are less clear but are a combination 
of domestic economic issues and national security concerns.  Canada, France, Luxemburg, and 
Portugal experience a mixture of downsizing and expansion in expenditure growth between the 




The North Atlantic Treaty establishing NATO specifies the principal purpose of the 
alliance in Article 5, which states, “an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or 
North America shall be considered an attack against them all."  This premise has never been 
seriously challenged until September 11, 2001 since no NATO member has suffered a direct 
attack necessitating a military response.12  As such, one could conclude that NATO as an alliance 
has fulfilled its mission.  Deterrence has worked.  However, the policy of deterrence rests 
primarily with the US strategic forces and to a lesser extent with those of the larger allies such as 
the UK and France.  A closer look at the behavior of even the three largest allies indicates a 
preoccupation with national issues over NATO issues. 
The results of the structural analysis tests suggest that NATO allies do not have an 
integrated response to NATO specific defense issues.  There is no evidence to suggest that 
NATO members are responding in a joint and concerted manner to threats or responding to the 
adoption of the three doctrine changes.  There is no indication that the NATO allies attempted to 
create forces capable of defense after the adoption of the flexible response doctrine.  In fact, it 
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appears that long before the formal end of the cold war, the allies were reducing the growth of 
defense expenditures.  The last structural break for all the allies, no matter when it occurred, is 
followed either a slowdown or downsizing in defense expenditure growth.13  
Further efforts to study NATO should attempt to examine force structure to determine if 
changes in alliance behavior can be explained by internal reconfigurations of forces in 
conjunction with changes in spending patterns.14  In addition, alliance behavior can be analyzed 
by using temporal and spatial methods to explain its interactions.  Finally, researchers should 
control for and isolate country specific effects. Instead of focusing on whether NATO members 
behave as allies, researchers should ascertain how much of their behavior is influenced by 
belonging to the alliance and in what manner.  The question of interest becomes the issue of 
motivation.  How do you motivate allies to conform and contribute to an alliance in a meaningful 
and productive way? 
 
 
                                                
1 Article 5 of  North Atlantic Treaty of 1949. 
2 See Khanna and Sandler (1996) and Sandler and Murdoch (2000) for a discussion on NATO doctrine. 
3 Iceland maintains no military but its strategic location allows it to host NATO bases. 
4 Congressional Budget Office (CBO), 2000.   
5 Dates and events are summarized from NATO update available online on 
http://www.nato.int/docu/update/index.htm 
6 The Bai and Perron formulation allows for general forms of serial correlation and heteroskedasticity  in the errors.  
It also allows lagged dependent variables,  trending regressors as well as different distributions for the errors and the 
regressors across data segments. 
7 Our interest is the presence of a structural change in the mean of the series.  As such, we apply the following 




''                                     jj TTt ,...,11 += !  
for 1,...,1 += mj  where 
t
y is the observed dependent variable at time t ; 
t
x  ( p x 1) and 
t
z  (q x 1) are vectors of 
covariates and !  and j!  are the corresponding vectors of coefficients; tµ is the disturbance at time t.  The break 
dates occur at {T1,…,Tm).  For this study, tz = {1} and q=1, for the case of changes in the mean of a series and p=0 
for a pure structural change model where all the coefficients are subject to change. 
8 The upper bound of breaks is set equal to that specified for the sequential procedure. 
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9 Bai and Peron (1998) show in simulation experiments that a small value for trimming such as 5% can lead to tests 
with substantial size distortions when sample size is small  and the variances of errors across the data segments are 
different  or when serial correlation is permitted.  This is because the researcher is trying to estimate quantities using 
very few observations and could end up estimating for some segments, values like the variance of the residuals, 
using only several observations. Bai and Perron recommend trimming values of  15% or higher in this case and a 
maximum number of breaks based on the trimming value, 5 breaks for a trimming value of 15%.  The maximum 
number of breaks is set to 2]/1int[ !"  breaks where !  is the trimming size. 
10 Devarajan, Shantayanan, Vinaya Swaroop and Heng-fu Zou (1996) include a detailed discussion of the effects of 
decentralization on defense expenditures. 
11 See Amara (2006) for a discussion regarding the level of Turkey defense expenditures over time. 
12 Less than 24 hours after the attack on September 11, 2003, NATO invoked Article 5 for the first time.  However, 
this was seen as a gesture of political support rather than a call for the allies to take collective military action.    The 
alliance’s military role and commitment has been minimal so far. 
13 The data used in this study does not extend beyond 2004.  It is not yet apparent what the effects of  the 
commitments by NATO allies to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan may be. 
14 Thanks to Col. Michael Meese for bringing  this explanation to my attention. 
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TABLE 1  MAD (1949-1966) dates and defining events 
 
Date  Defining Events 
 
1949 The ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty establishing NATO.  The principal 
purpose of the alliance is specified in Article 5 which states that “an armed attack 
against one or more of them in  Europe or North America shall be considered an 
attack against them all." 
1952  In a  meeting in Lisbon, NATO leaders agreed that the alliance needs capabilities 
equal to those of the Soviet Union and proposed that members specialize in 
providing certain services.  In addition, Greece and Turkey acceded to NATO. 
1953  Joseph Stalin, who had led the Soviet Union for almost 30 years, died and was 
succeeded by Nikita Khrushchev.  These events seem to herald a thaw in East-
West relations, particularly with the formulation of the Soviet policy of peaceful 
co-existence. Later that year, the USSR reveals its possession of the hydrogen 
bomb. Thus the United States loses its nuclear supremacy and with it the strong 
guarantee of Western security.  
1954   The North Atlantic Council authorized NATO to use strategic weapons to counter 
any aggression. 
1955  The Soviet Union concludes the Warsaw Treaty with Albania, Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Romania, and in December 
signs a treaty with the regime in East Germany transforming it into a State.  
1956   The Hungary uprising is quickly suppressed by Soviet troops. 
 1961   East Germany begins building the Berlin Wall.  
1962   The development of the Cuban missile  crisis  
1965  The North Atlantic Council meeting in Ministerial session in Paris accepts new 
procedures designed to improve the annual process of reviewing the defense 
efforts of member countries and agreeing upon their force contributions. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
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TABLE 2  Flexible Response (1967-1988) dates and defining events 
 
Date  Defining Events 
 
1967 The Harmel Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance is finalized. NATO 
decides to adopt a revised strategic concept to replace the massive retaliation 
doctrine. The new strategy, flexible response, is based on a balanced range of 
responses involving the use of conventional as well as nuclear weapons. 
1968  Czechoslovakia uprising suppressed by Soviets 
1970 The US and the Soviet Union, having reached nuclear parity, seek to impose 
limitations on their respective nuclear arsenals. In 1970, the nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty comes into force.  
1972 An interim agreement on strategic arms limitations (SALT 1) and an anti-ballistic 
missile systems (the ABM Treaty) are both signed.   Allied Ministers had agreed 
to begin multilateral talks in preparation for a Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe.  
1973   The Allies propose a common ceiling on the two sides' ground forces 
1976 Allies express concern at the growth in the Warsaw Treaty's military strength, 
review national force contributions and agree to the need for further strengthening 
of NATO conventional defenses.  
1978 NATO leaders agree to raise real defense spending by three percent annually to 
and adopt the Long Term Defense Program to ensure that the ability of the 
alliance to meet future needs. 
1979 The SALT II agreement to curtail the manufacture of strategic nuclear weapons is 
signed.  
1981 France and the UK begin to modernize their strategic nuclear forces and the 
Reagan administration embarks on a significant build up of the US military 
forces.  The US accuses allies of not contributing fair share to collective security 
and US Senate threatens to reduce defense spending if the allies do not increase 
European defense  





TABLE 3  Crisis Management (1990 to the present) dates and defining events 
 
Date  Defining Events 
1991 During the Rome summit,  the allies determine that NATO must assume 
responsibility for security challenges both within and beyond NATO boundaries. 
Gulf War is fought and the Communist regimes in Europe start to collapse. 
1992  At the Oslo summit, peacekeeping is added as part of NATO’s new strategic crisis 
management doctrine 
1994  NATO broadens strategic doctrine to include the policing for the non proliferation 
of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. 
1995   NATO peacekeepers deployed in Bosnia. 
1999  NATO peacekeepers deployed in Kosovo. 
2003   Iraq war starts. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
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TABLE 4 Structural Break Dates for NATO Defense Expenditures
Country Breaks Break Year supF(2|1) supF(3|2) supF(4|3) supF(5l4) WDmax Udmax
Belgium 2 1969, 1991 8.54* 5.6 0.02 1.41 79.96*** 31.94***
Canada 5 1956, 1964, 1975, 1983, 1994 0.18 9.65* 4.64 11.33* 64.00*** 26.65***
Denmark 2 1961,1974 26.16*** 0.004 0.004 5.19 45.86*** 22.29***
France 5 1956,1965, 1976, 1984,1994 3.25 0.52 0.37 21.29*** 57.98*** 35.67***
Germany 3 1960, 1971, 2001 1.18 134.93*** 6.65 2.17 136.28*** 56.27***
Greece 1 1968 0.6 1.05 0.24 2.43 175.75*** 111.56***
Italy 1 1973 3.5 1.09 2.52 2.52 626.87*** 259.07***
Luxemburg 3 1975, 1986, 1996 4.23 26.69*** 0.07 0.21 133.25*** 53.24***
Netherlands 1 1963 0.4 3.75 1.05 0.016 103.02*** 50.07***
Norway 1 1967 4.27 3.69 3.69 2.36 30.40*** 19.30***
Portugal 3 1960, 1975, 1987 0.61 36.28*** 0.01 0.01 227.94*** 14.68***
Turkey 1 1978 2.18 3.4 5.49 5.49 19.55*** 7.81*
UK 3 1963, 1973, 1992 42.52*** 11.56** 2.57 0 95.43*** 48.07***
USA 1 1956 0.27 0.81 0.85 0.11 31.38*** 15.80***
*, **, ***  indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively
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TABLE 5 Prebreak and Postbreak Average Annual Defense Expenditure Growth Rates
Country 1 2 3 4 5 6
Belgium 1969 1991    
6.23% 1.54% -2.44%
Canada 1956 1964 1975 1983 1994
28.94% -2.08% -0.40% 3.32% 0.90% 0.37%
Denmark 1961 1974    
7.40% 3.70% 0.46%  
France 1956 1965 1976 1984 1994
12.40% 1.55% 1.87% 2.63% 0.34% -0.40%
Germany 1960 1971 2001   
10.90% 4.47% 0.52% 0.33%   
Greece 1968   
6.56% 2.91%  
Italy 1973   
4.63% 0.53%   
Luxemburg 1975 1986 1996   
6.88% 3.90% 4.10% 3.99%   
Netherlands 1963    
5.60% 0.49%
Norway 1967    
6.17% 1.39%    
Portugal 1960 1975 1987  
6.27% 7.07% -0.84% 0.97%  
Turkey 1978     
20.26% 13.11%     
UK 1963 1973 1992
3.54% 1.57% 0.50% -1.16%
USA 1956     
20.95% 1.17%     
Note: The entry in column 1 is the average annual defense growth rate before the first break. 
The entries in columns 2 through 6 are the average annual defense expenditure growth after the break.  
The break dates are in italics.
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TABLE 6 NATO Allies Structural breaks by period
                                      MAD                                                                               Flexible Response                                           Crisis Management
Country              (1949-1966) (1967-1989) (1990- 2004)
Belgium   69 91
+! "!
Canada   56  64 75  83 94
"! "! +# +! "!
Denmark   61 74
+! +!
France   56  65  76  84 94
+! +# +# +! "!
Germany   60  71   1
+! +! +!
Greece  68   
+!
Italy   73  
+!
Luxemburg    75 86 96
+! +# +!
Netherlands   63
+!
Norway    67   
+!
Portugal    60   75  87
+# "! +#
Turkey      78    
+!
UK  63 73 92  
+! +! "!
USA   56       
+!
The arrow below each date indicates the direction of the mean growth rate after the break   
A +!  below the year indicates a positive growth in average annual defense expenditures that is less than the average before the prebreak year
A +? below the year indicates a positive growth in average annual defense expenditures that is greater than the average before prebreak year
A -! below a year indicates a negative growth in average annual defense expenditures that is less than the average before the prebreak year  
